A stable and Pareto efficient update of matching in school choice

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2016
Volume: 143
Issue: C
Pages: 111-113

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We consider a situation where a student–school matching has already been temporarily decided, but unexpectedly the quotas of some schools are increased and/or some new schools enter. Furthermore, the school priority orders are allowed to be weak. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm to derive a student optimal stable matching under the profile of increased quotas that Pareto dominates the stable matching under that of initial quotas.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:143:y:2016:i:c:p:111-113
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26