Priority matchings revisited

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2014
Volume: 88
Issue: C
Pages: 242-249

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We consider a pairwise kidney exchange model. Roth et al. (2005) define priority matchings of the model and introduce a mechanism to derive them. In this paper, we re-examine the priority matching. First, we consider a general priority ordering where multiple patients may hold equal priority. We provide a characterization of the priority matchings by using the concept of alternating paths. Using the characterization, we examine the effect of a small change in the priority order on a set of priority matchings. Moreover, we provide an efficient method to find a priority matching.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:88:y:2014:i:c:p:242-249
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-26