Discretion and Incentives in Organizations.

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Labor Economics
Year: 2000
Volume: 18
Issue: 3
Pages: 377-404

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We analyze the link between workers' discretion and incentives in an organisation that lasts for several periods. In a long-lasting affiliation, it is possible for the principal to learn and update her beliefs about essential characteristics associated with either the job or the agent. This learning possibility has an important effect on the link between workers' discretion and incentives. Copyright 2000 by University of Chicago Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jlabec:v:18:y:2000:i:3:p:377-404
Journal Field
Labor
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-26