Choosing k from m: Feasible elimination procedures reconsidered

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2017
Volume: 103
Issue: C
Pages: 254-261

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We show that feasible elimination procedures (Peleg, 1978) can be used to select k from m alternatives. An important advantage of this method is the core property: no coalition can guarantee an outcome that is preferred by all its members. We also show that the problem of determining whether a specific k-tuple can result from a feasible elimination procedure is computationally equivalent to the problem of finding a maximal matching in a bipartite graph.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:103:y:2017:i:c:p:254-261
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29