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2017
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Choosing k from m: Feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2014
|
Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
|
Economic Theory
|
B
|
2
|
|
2012
|
Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury
|
Social Choice and Welfare
|
C
|
2
|
|
2009
|
Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2008
|
Lexicographic composition of simple games
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2008
|
My joint work with Michael Maschler
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
1
|
|
2006
|
On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
2
|
|
2006
|
Consistent Voting Systems with a Continuum of Voters
|
Social Choice and Welfare
|
C
|
2
|
|
2006
|
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
|
Social Choice and Welfare
|
C
|
2
|
|
2005
|
On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
2
|
|
2002
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Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof Nash equilibrium: A complete characterization
|
Social Choice and Welfare
|
C
|
2
|
|
2001
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Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
2
|
|
2000
|
The canonical extensive form of a game form: Part II. Representation
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Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
3
|
|
1998
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Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition - proof
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
1998
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Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions
|
Social Choice and Welfare
|
C
|
2
|
|
1997
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A difficulty with Nash's program: A proof of a special case
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
1997
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An Axiomatization of Nash Equilibria in Economic Situations
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
1997
|
Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
|
Social Choice and Welfare
|
C
|
1
|
|
1996
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Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
3
|
|
1996
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Minimality of Consistent Solutions for Strategic Games, in Particular for Potential Games.
|
Economic Theory
|
B
|
3
|
|
1995
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Minimal of consitent solutions for strategic games,in paticular for potential games
|
Economic Theory
|
B
|
3
|
|
1992
|
Short-rune stable matchings between bees and flowers
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
1992
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The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
1991
|
Linear measures of inequality for cooperative games
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1987
|
Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
1985
|
An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
1
|
|
1984
|
A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1982
|
Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
2
|
|
1980
|
A theory of coalition formation in committees
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
1
|
|
1975
|
Efficient random variables
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
1
|
|
1975
|
Efficiency Analysis for Multivariate Distributions
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
3
|
|
1974
|
A note on Gale's example
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
2
|
|
1974
|
The modified golden rule of a multi-sector economy
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
2
|
|
1973
|
On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes are Changing
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
2
|
|
1972
|
On Optimal Consumption Plans in a Multi-sector Economy
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
2
|
|
1970
|
Efficiency prices in an infinite-dimensional space
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|