Sequential auctions with synergies: The paradox of positive synergies

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2010
Volume: 109
Issue: 3
Pages: 139-141

Authors (3)

Leufkens, Kasper (not in RePEc) Peeters, Ronald (University of Otago) Vermeulen, Dries (Maastricht University)

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

We show that synergies enhance bidding competition to such an extent that they are a curse rather than a blessing for the bidders.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:109:y:2010:i:3:p:139-141
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29