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Dries Vermeulen

Global rank #3461 96%

Institution: Maastricht University

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

First Publication: 1996

Most Recent: 2023

RePEc ID: pve191 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 2.68 0.00 3.18
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.00 5.70 0.00 6.20
All Time 0.00 0.00 17.43 0.00 18.27

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 26
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 19.19

Publications (26)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2023 Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games Games and Economic Behavior B 4
2023 Strategic rationing in Stackelberg games Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2022 Strategic transfers between cooperative games Games and Economic Behavior B 4
2021 Equilibrium existence with spillover demand Economics Letters C 2
2021 On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in price–quantity games Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
2019 On the topology of the set of Nash equilibria Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2019 Claim games for estate division problems Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2017 Zero-sum games with charges Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2016 Behavioral perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2014 Universality of Nash components Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2014 A strategic approach to multiple estate division problems Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2013 Dynamic competition with consumer inertia Journal of Mathematical Economics B 4
2013 Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2011 Non-cooperative solutions for estate division problems Games and Economic Behavior B 4
2011 Inefficiency of equilibria in digital mechanisms with continuous valuations Journal of Mathematical Economics B 4
2010 Sequential auctions with synergies: The paradox of positive synergies Economics Letters C 3
2007 The private value single item bisection auction Economic Theory B 4
2007 Revision of conjectures about the opponent’s utilities in signaling games Economic Theory B 4
2005 On the computation of stable sets for bimatrix games Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
2002 Convergence of Bayesian learning to general equilibrium in mis-specified models Journal of Mathematical Economics B 3
2001 An ordinal selection of stable sets in the sense of Hillas Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
2001 On the computation of stable sets and strictly perfect equilibria Economic Theory B 2
2000 Ordinality of solutions of noncooperative games Journal of Mathematical Economics B 2
1999 Axiomatizations of Pareto Equilibria in Multicriteria Games Games and Economic Behavior B 3
1997 Extending Invariant Solutions Games and Economic Behavior B 2
1996 Equilibrium Selection and Consistency Games and Economic Behavior B 4