How cognitive skills affect strategic behavior: Cognitive ability, fluid intelligence and judgment

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2025
Volume: 149
Issue: C
Pages: 82-95

Authors (4)

Gill, David (not in RePEc) Knepper, Zachary (not in RePEc) Prowse, Victoria (Purdue University) Zhou, Junya (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We explore the influence of cognitive ability and judgment on strategic behavior in the beauty contest game (where the Nash equilibrium action is zero). Using the level-k model of bounded rationality, cognitive ability and judgment both predict higher level strategic thinking. However, individuals with better judgment choose zero less frequently, and we uncover a novel dynamic mechanism that sheds light on this pattern. Taken together, our results indicate that fluid (i.e., analytical) intelligence is a primary driver of strategic level-k thinking, while facets of judgment that are distinct from fluid intelligence drive the lower inclination of high judgment individuals to choose zero.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:149:y:2025:i:c:p:82-95
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-29