Balancing the power to appoint officers

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2017
Volume: 101
Issue: C
Pages: 189-203

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Rules of k names are two-stage procedures where a first set of agents, the proposers, select k individuals from a set of candidates, and then another agent, the chooser, appoints one among those k in the list. The list of k names is often arrived at by letting each of the proposers vote for v candidates and then choosing those k with the highest support. We then speak of v-rules of k names. We study how different choices of the parameters v and k affect the balance of power between the proposers and the choosers. We analyze a strategic game where the proposers interact to determine what list of candidates to submit. We investigate the impact of the choice of parameters v and k upon the distribution of power among the proposers and the chooser, and we discuss how to eventually balance it.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:101:y:2017:i:c:p:189-203
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24