|
2025
|
Condorcet Consistency and Pairwise Justifiability Under Variable Agendas
|
International Economic Review
|
B
|
4
|
|
2023
|
Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2022
|
Compromising on compromise rules
|
RAND Journal of Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2022
|
Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
3
|
|
2022
|
Order-k rationality
|
Economic Theory
|
B
|
4
|
|
2022
|
Deciding on What to Decide
|
International Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
2017
|
Balancing the power to appoint officers
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2016
|
Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
3
|
|
2015
|
Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
3
|
|
2012
|
Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
3
|
|
2011
|
Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2011
|
Preference for flexibility and the opportunities of choice
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
2
|
|
2010
|
On the rule of k names
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2010
|
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2009
|
A special issue of the IJGT in honor of Michael Maschler
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2008
|
Michael Maschler in Barcelona
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
1
|
|
2007
|
A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2006
|
Locating public facilities by majority: Stability, consistency and group formation
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2006
|
On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union
|
Journal of Political Economy
|
S
|
2
|
|
2005
|
Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394]
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2005
|
Voting by committees under constraints
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2004
|
Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
|
Quarterly Journal of Economics
|
S
|
2
|
|
2002
|
Supporting others and the evolution of influence
|
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
|
B
|
2
|
|
2002
|
Self-Selection Consistent Functions
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2001
|
Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
3
|
|
2001
|
Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
1998
|
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
3
|
|
1997
|
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
3
|
|
1997
|
Voting under Constraints
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
1995
|
Protective behavior in matching models
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
1994
|
Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems.
|
Economic Theory
|
B
|
2
|
|
1993
|
Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
1988
|
Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1984
|
Extending an order on a Set to the power set: Some remarks on Kannai and Peleg's approach
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1984
|
On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
1982
|
Implementability via protective equilibria
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
2
|
|
1980
|
Pivotal voters : A new proof of arrow's theorem
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
1980
|
Stable voting schemes
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
1
|
|
1979
|
Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
1
|
|
1978
|
Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1977
|
Manipulation of social decision functions
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
1
|