Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2013
Volume: 81
Issue: C
Pages: 179-191

Authors (3)

Lehrer, Ehud (not in RePEc) Rosenberg, Dinah (HEC Paris (École des Hautes Ét...) Shmaya, Eran (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a game with incomplete information players receive stochastic signals about the state of nature. The distribution of the signals given the state of nature is determined by the information structure. Different information structures may induce different equilibria.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:81:y:2013:i:c:p:179-191
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29