Institution: HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales)
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.00 | 5.36 | 0.00 | 5.36 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2013 | On games of strategic experimentation | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2013 | Strategic information exchange | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2013 | Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2010 | Signaling and mediation in games with common interests | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2010 | A note on the evaluation of information in zero-sum repeated games | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 2 |
| 2009 | Informational externalities and emergence of consensus | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2006 | What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information? | Journal of Mathematical Economics | B | 2 |