Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2007
Volume: 97
Issue: 3
Pages: 828-851

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a "double coincidence of wants." Developing infrastructure to perform three-way as well as two-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be arranged. Larger than three-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types. (JEL C78, I12)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:3:p:828-851
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29