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Tayfun Sönmez

Global rank #416 99%

Institution: Boston College

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://www.tayfunsonmez.net/

First Publication: 1994

Most Recent: 2024

RePEc ID: psi57 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 1.68 0.00 0.50 0.00 7.46
Last 10 Years 4.19 1.34 0.50 0.00 20.70
All Time 14.08 14.08 7.54 0.00 94.26

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 39
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 40.39

Publications (39)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2024 Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process: A Case Study in Minimalist Market Design American Economic Review S 3
2022 Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 4
2022 Reserve system design for allocation of scarce medical resources in a pandemic: some perspectives from the field Oxford Review of Economic Policy C 4
2022 Affirmative Action in India via Vertical, Horizontal, and Overlapping Reservations Econometrica S 2
2020 Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: Theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2020 Incentivized Kidney Exchange American Economic Review S 3
2020 Efficient and Incentive‐Compatible Liver Exchange Econometrica S 3
2018 Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston’s Walk Zones Journal of Political Economy S 4
2018 How (not) to integrate blood subtyping technology to kidney exchange Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2017 Market design for living-donor organ exchanges: an economic policy perspective Oxford Review of Economic Policy C 2
2017 Dual‐Donor Organ Exchange Econometrica S 3
2014 Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2013 Matching with Contracts: Comment American Economic Review S 2
2013 School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation American Economic Review S 2
2013 Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching Mechanism Journal of Political Economy S 1
2011 Corrigendum to "School choice: An experimental study" [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231] Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2010 House allocation with existing tenants: A characterization Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2008 Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism American Economic Review S 2
2007 Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences American Economic Review S 3
2006 School choice: an experimental study Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2006 Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism Journal of Public Economics A 2
2005 The Boston Public School Match American Economic Review S 4
2005 A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England American Economic Review S 2
2005 Pairwise kidney exchange Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2005 House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2004 An experimental study of house allocation mechanisms Economics Letters C 2
2004 Kidney Exchange Quarterly Journal of Economics S 3
2003 School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach American Economic Review S 2
2003 Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2002 Improving Efficiency of On-Campus Housing: An Experimental Study American Economic Review S 2
1999 A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1999 Can Pre-arranged Matches Be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1999 House Allocation with Existing Tenants Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1997 Games of Manipulation in Marriage Problems Games and Economic Behavior B 1
1997 Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1997 Implementation of college admission rules (*) Economic Theory B 2
1996 Nash Implementation of Matching Rules Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1996 Implementation in generalized matching problems Journal of Mathematical Economics B 1
1994 Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule Economics Letters C 1