Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2009
Volume: 103
Issue: 1
Pages: 33-35

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The data reported in this paper show that in an ultimatum mini-game rejection rates of low offers are significantly reduced if participation for responders is voluntary but costly. A possible explanation based on cognitive dissonance and loss aversion is offered.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:103:y:2009:i:1:p:33-35
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29