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2025
|
Public–private partnerships, asymmetric information, and incomplete contracts
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2024
|
When should the government own the physical assets needed to provide public goods?
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2023
|
Contracting under asymmetric information and externalities: an experimental study
|
Experimental Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2023
|
Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: Punishment or rent extraction?
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2023
|
Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2023
|
The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
1
|
|
2022
|
How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts
|
Economic Journal
|
A
|
1
|
|
2021
|
How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects
|
Scandanavian Journal of Economics
|
B
|
2
|
|
2021
|
On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2021
|
Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information
|
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
|
B
|
1
|
|
2021
|
The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract
|
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2021
|
Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
1
|
|
2020
|
Public goods, property rights, and investment incentives: An experimental investigation
|
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2020
|
Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2019
|
Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2018
|
Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
2018
|
Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2017
|
The management of innovation: Experimental evidence
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2017
|
Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2017
|
Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2017
|
Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives
|
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
|
B
|
1
|
|
2016
|
The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2016
|
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
2015
|
Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2015
|
Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2015
|
Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
1
|
|
2014
|
Investments as signals of outside options
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2014
|
Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2013
|
Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation
|
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
|
B
|
3
|
|
2013
|
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering
|
RAND Journal of Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2013
|
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2013
|
Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2013
|
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2013
|
Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2013
|
Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
1
|
|
2013
|
Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
2
|
|
2012
|
REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY
|
International Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
2012
|
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2012
|
Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices
|
Scandanavian Journal of Economics
|
B
|
2
|
|
2012
|
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2012
|
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2012
|
The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2011
|
Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2010
|
The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2010
|
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
B
|
1
|
|
2010
|
Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2009
|
Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases
|
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
|
B
|
3
|
|
2009
|
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
3
|
|
2008
|
Task scheduling and moral hazard
|
Economic Theory
|
B
|
2
|
|
2008
|
Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2008
|
Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2008
|
Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2007
|
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?
|
Economica
|
C
|
2
|
|
2007
|
Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2007
|
Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
1
|
|
2006
|
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
1
|
|
2005
|
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages
|
Labour Economics
|
B
|
1
|
|
2004
|
Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
1
|
|
2003
|
Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2003
|
On second-price auctions and imperfect competition
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
B
|
1
|
|
2002
|
Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
1
|
|
2002
|
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
1
|
|
2002
|
On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
1
|
|
2001
|
On synergies and vertical integration
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2000
|
"Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts
|
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
1999
|
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
1998
|
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment.
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
1998
|
Randomization in Coalition Contracts.
|
Public Choice
|
B
|
1
|
|
1998
|
Randomization in coalition contracts
|
Public Choice
|
B
|
1
|