Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2008
Volume: 101
Issue: 3
Pages: 268-271

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A risk-neutral seller exerts effort while producing a good. The risk-neutral buyer can gather private information about his valuation. The ex ante optimal contract may encourage information gathering, although it is ex post efficient to trade regardless of the valuation.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:101:y:2008:i:3:p:268-271
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29