The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2010
Volume: 107
Issue: 1
Pages: 58-62

Authors (2)

Hoppe, Eva I. (Universität zu Köln) Schmitz, Patrick W. (Universität zu Köln)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

We study the effect of additional private information in an agency model with an endogenous information structure. If more private information becomes available to the agent, this may hurt the agent, benefit the principal, and affect the total surplus ambiguously.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:1:p:58-62
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29