Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 117
Issue: 3
Pages: 642-645

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

An agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment. A principal then offers to collaborate with the agent to provide a public good. Private information of the agent about his valuation may either decrease or increase his investment incentives, depending on whether he learns his type before or after the investment stage.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:642-645
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29