The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 117
Issue: 3
Pages: 841-843

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

An inventor can invest research effort to come up with an innovation. Once an innovation is made, a contract is negotiated and unobservable effort must be exerted to develop a product. In the absence of liability constraints, the inventor’s investment incentives are increasing in his bargaining power. Yet, given limited liability, overinvestments may occur and the inventor’s investment incentives may be decreasing in his bargaining power.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:841-843
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29