Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2015
Volume: 129
Issue: C
Pages: 116-120

Authors (2)

Müller, Daniel (not in RePEc) Schmitz, Patrick W. (Universität zu Köln)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

When penalties for first-time offenders are restricted, it is typically optimal for the lawmaker to overdeter repeat offenders. First-time offenders are then deterred not only by the (restricted) fine for a first offense, but also by the prospect of a large fine for a subsequent offense. Now suppose the restriction on penalties for first-time offenders is relaxed; i.e., larger fines for a first offense become enforceable. Should overdeterrence of repeat offenders now be reduced? We show that this is the case only if the original restriction was not very strong. Otherwise, overdeterrence of repeat offenders should actually be further amplified.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:129:y:2015:i:c:p:116-120
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29