Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2008
Volume: 99
Issue: 3
Pages: 577-580

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In the standard property rights theory, joint ownership cannot be optimal, because it induces smaller investments in human capital than ownership by a single party. This result can be overturned if the parties have private information about the payoffs they can realize on their own.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:3:p:577-580
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29