Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Public Economics
Year: 2010
Volume: 94
Issue: 3-4
Pages: 258-268

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The government wants a certain good or service to be provided. Should the required assets be publicly or privately owned or should a partnership be formed? Building on the incomplete contracting approach, we argue that the initially specified quantity of an ex ante describable basic good can have important effects on investment incentives, which has been neglected in the literature so far. We also study how the tasks of investing in quality improvements and cost reductions should be assigned. We show how the optimal contracts and governance structures depend on the exogenous parameters of the model such as the nature of the investments and the parties' bargaining powers.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:pubeco:v:94:y:2010:i:3-4:p:258-268
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29