Common-value group contests with asymmetric information

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2020
Volume: 192
Issue: C

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study contests between two groups where all the players have a common value of winning. In each group one of the players has an information advantage over the other players. This player is referred to as the dominant player. We show that a group contest is equivalent to a contest between the dominant players, and, as such, the expected total effort of both groups is always the same, while their probabilities of winning as well their expected total payoff are not.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:192:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520301270
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29