|
2025
|
Status classification by lottery contests
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
1
|
|
2025
|
Unsolicited prizes in contests
|
Social Choice and Welfare
|
C
|
1
|
|
2024
|
Intermediate prizes in multi-dimensional contests
|
Theory and Decision
|
C
|
1
|
|
2023
|
The role of the second prize in all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous prizes
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
4
|
|
2023
|
Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2023
|
Two-stage elimination games
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
1
|
|
2022
|
Effort allocations in elimination tournaments
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2021
|
The optimal allocation of prizes in two-stage contests
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2020
|
Common-value group contests with asymmetric information
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2020
|
On the optimal allocation of prizes in best-of-three all-pay auctions
|
Social Choice and Welfare
|
C
|
2
|
|
2019
|
Sequential (one-against-all) contests
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2019
|
Information in Tullock contests
|
Theory and Decision
|
C
|
6
|
|
2018
|
Tullock contests reward information advantages
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
6
|
|
2018
|
Asymmetric sequential search under incomplete information
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
2
|
|
2018
|
Sequential contests with first and secondary prizes
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2017
|
Round‐Robin Tournaments with a Dominant Player
|
Scandanavian Journal of Economics
|
B
|
3
|
|
2017
|
First-mover advantage in round-robin tournaments
|
Social Choice and Welfare
|
C
|
3
|
|
2015
|
Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
5
|
|
2014
|
All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2014
|
Caps in Sequential Contests
|
Economic Inquiry
|
C
|
2
|
|
2014
|
Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
2014
|
Sequential all-pay auctions with noisy outputs
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
2
|
|
2014
|
Sequential contests with synergy and budget constraints
|
Social Choice and Welfare
|
C
|
2
|
|
2014
|
Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts
|
Social Choice and Welfare
|
C
|
2
|
|
2013
|
Allocation of Prizes in Contests with Participation Constraints
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
2
|
|
2013
|
Dynamic contests with resource constraints
|
Social Choice and Welfare
|
C
|
2
|
|
2012
|
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests
|
Economic Inquiry
|
C
|
3
|
|
2012
|
Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments
|
Economic Theory
|
B
|
4
|
|
2012
|
The assortative matching scheme in a survival battle
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2012
|
Sequential two-prize contests
|
Economic Theory
|
B
|
1
|
|
2011
|
Best-of-three all-pay auctions
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|
|
2010
|
Effective contests
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2009
|
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
3
|
|
2008
|
Optimal rewards in contests
|
RAND Journal of Economics
|
A
|
3
|
|
2008
|
Competing auctions with endogenous quantities
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2007
|
Contests for Status
|
Journal of Political Economy
|
S
|
3
|
|
2006
|
Contest architecture
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2005
|
Manipulations in contests
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2004
|
Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2003
|
Patent licensing to Bertrand competitors
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2002
|
Low and high types in asymmetric first-price auctions
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
3
|
|
2002
|
Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
4
|
|
2002
|
All–Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards
|
Journal of Industrial Economics
|
A
|
4
|
|
2001
|
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
2000
|
Fictitious Play in 2 x 3 Games
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
1
|
|
1999
|
Fictitious play in `one-against-all' multi-player games
|
Economic Theory
|
B
|
1
|
|
1998
|
You play (an action) only once
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
1998
|
A Learning Approach to Auctions,
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
1997
|
Belief Affirming in Learning Processes,
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
1996
|
A2 x 2Game without the Fictitious Play Property
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|