Score contribution per author:
α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count
This paper provides a more general model of the determination of rent-seeking costs by combining the following features: endogenous rent determination, asymmetric effectiveness of contending agents in their lobbying efforts, and multiple periods. In doing so, the paper generalizes some aspects of the work of Applebaum and Katz (1987), Rogerson (1982), Leininger (1992), and Kohli (1992). Some results obtained are: (1) in the short run, when the regulator's salary is higher than in an alternative occupation, both the per unit cost of rentseeking and the total rent set by regulator are highest for the same value of the relative effectiveness parameter; (2) in the long run, an increase in the effectiveness parameter leads to a reduction in the social costs of rent seeking; and (3) in a repeated game, the equilibrium rent is lower the higher is the regulator's discount factor. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers