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Nirvikar Singh

Global rank #2903 96%

Institution: University of California-Santa Cruz (UCSC)

Primary Field: Development (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://campusdirectory.ucsc.edu/cd_detail?uid=boxjenk

First Publication: 1984

Most Recent: 2014

RePEc ID: psi60 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
All Time 2.01 5.70 6.03 0.00 31.00

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 19
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 24.91

Publications (19)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2014 Does too much finance harm economic growth? Journal of Banking & Finance B 2
2011 Structural change and growth in India Economics Letters C 2
2009 Equilibrium vengeance Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2004 Information Technology and Broad-Based Development: Preliminary Lessons from North India World Development B 2
2001 Limited liability, contractual choice, and the tenancy ladder Journal of Development Economics A 2
2001 Contests where there is variation in the marginal productivity of effort Economic Theory B 2
2000 Impediments and Innovation in International Rivers: The Waters of South Asia World Development B 2
2000 Welfare Policy: Cash Versus Kind, Self‐Selection and Notches Southern Economic Journal C 2
1999 Rent Seeking and Rent Setting with Asymmetric Effectiveness of Lobbying. Public Choice B 2
1998 The composition of U.S.-East Asia trade and changing comparative advantage Journal of Development Economics A 3
1997 Nash bargaining with the option to wait Economics Letters C 1
1995 Unilateral altruism may be beneficial: A game-theoretic illustration Economics Letters C 1
1991 Posterior-preserving information improvements and principal-agent relationships Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1990 Regulating externalities through testing Journal of Public Economics A 2
1989 Exports and growth : Critical minimum effort and diminishing returns Journal of Development Economics A 2
1985 Commitment and entry-deterrence in a model of duopoly Economics Letters C 2
1985 Monitoring and Hierarchies: The Marginal Value of Information in a Principal-Agent Model. Journal of Political Economy S 1
1984 Moral hazard : Economic meaning of the conditions justifying the first-order approach Economics Letters C 1
1984 Moral hazard with a finite number of states Economics Letters C 1