Asymmetric partnerships

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 115
Issue: 2
Pages: 268-271

Authors (2)

Figueroa, Nicolás (not in RePEc) Skreta, Vasiliki (University of Texas-Austin)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study asymmetric partnerships and show that efficient dissolution is possible if critical types (where participation constraints bind) are equal. Ownership structures guaranteeing equal critical types always exist, but can be extremely unequal.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:2:p:268-271
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29