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Vasiliki Skreta

Global rank #1920 97%

Institution: University of Texas-Austin

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: http://vskreta.wixsite.com/vskreta

First Publication: 2006

Most Recent: 2025

RePEc ID: psk88 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 3.02 0.75 1.68 0.00 15.25
Last 10 Years 3.02 2.43 3.02 0.00 19.94
All Time 6.03 6.95 3.02 0.00 43.07

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 20
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 20.11

Publications (20)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2025 An issue dedicated to Konrad Mierendorff: Introduction European Economic Review B 3
2024 Mechanism design with limited commitment: Markov environments European Economic Review B 2
2023 Reflecting on the First 20 Years of the Journal of the European Economic Association Journal of the European Economic Association A 8
2023 Informed Information Design Journal of Political Economy S 2
2022 Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment Econometrica S 2
2022 Incentive-driven inattention Journal of Econometrics A 4
2022 Test Design Under Falsification Econometrica S 2
2020 Heterogeneity, Inattention, and Bayesian Updates American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics A 3
2020 IMMUNITY International Economic Review B 3
2018 Selling through referrals Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 3
2016 Informed seller with taste heterogeneity Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2015 Optimal auction design under non-commitment Journal of Economic Theory A 1
2014 Dynamic strategic information transmission Journal of Economic Theory A 4
2012 Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection American Economic Review S 2
2012 Asymmetric partnerships Economics Letters C 2
2009 The role of optimal threats in auction design Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2009 A note on optimal allocation mechanisms Economics Letters C 2
2009 Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation Journal of Monetary Economics A 2
2006 Mechanism design for arbitrary type spaces Economics Letters C 1
2006 Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms<xref ref-type="fn" rid="FN1">-super-1</xref> Review of Economic Studies S 1