Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms<xref ref-type="fn" rid="FN1">-super-1</xref>

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 2006
Volume: 73
Issue: 4
Pages: 1085-1111

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper establishes that posting a price in each period is a revenue-maximizing allocation mechanism in a finite period model without commitment. A risk-neutral seller has one object to sell and faces a risk-neutral buyer whose valuation is private information and drawn from an arbitrary bounded subset of the real line. The seller has all the bargaining power: she designs a mechanism to sell the object at t, but if trade does not occur at t she can propose another mechanism at t &#x002B; 1. We show that posting a price in each period is an optimal mechanism. A methodological contribution of the paper is to develop a procedure to characterize optimal dynamic incentive schemes under non-commitment that is valid irrespective of the structure of the agent's type. Copyright 2006, Wiley-Blackwell.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:73:y:2006:i:4:p:1085-1111
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29