Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 2015
Volume: 82
Issue: 2
Pages: 762-790

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We introduce ex post participation constraints in the standard sequential screening model. This captures the presence of consumer withdrawal rights as, for instance, mandated by European Union regulation of “distance sales contracts”. With such additional constraints, the optimal contract is static and, unlike with only ex ante participation constraints, does not elicit the agent's information sequentially. This holds whenever differences in ex ante and ex post outside options are below a positive upper bound. Welfare effects of mandatory withdrawal rights are ambiguous. Since it is insufficient in our setting to consider only local incentive constraints, we develop a novel technique to identify the relevant global constraints.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:82:y:2015:i:2:p:762-790
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29