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Roland Strausz

Global rank #559 99%

Institution: Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://sites.google.com/view/rolandstrausz/home

First Publication: 1997

Most Recent: 2025

RePEc ID: pst3 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 1.01 5.36 3.02 0.00 17.76
Last 10 Years 4.02 5.36 6.03 0.00 33.35
All Time 8.04 13.41 20.11 0.00 82.61

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 34
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 49.81

Publications (34)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2025 Unidirectional incentive compatibility Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2025 Dynamic screening with liquidity constraints Economic Theory B 2
2024 The Irrelevance of Fee Structures for Certification American Economic Review: Insights A 2
2024 Insourcing versus outsourcing in a vertical structure Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 2
2024 Correlation‐savvy sellers RAND Journal of Economics A 1
2023 Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures Journal of Industrial Economics A 3
2023 Collective Brand Reputation Journal of Political Economy S 2
2023 Optimal Nonlinear Pricing with Data-Sensitive Consumers American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 2
2021 Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider RAND Journal of Economics A 3
2017 A Theory of Crowdfunding: A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard American Economic Review S 1
2017 Sequential versus static screening: An equivalence result Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2017 Politically induced regulatory risk and independent regulatory agencies International Journal of Industrial Organization B 1
2017 Certification and Market Transparency Review of Economic Studies S 2
2016 Optimality of sequential screening with multiple units and ex post participation constraints Economics Letters C 2
2015 Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 2
2015 Ex post information rents in sequential screening Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2015 Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights Review of Economic Studies S 2
2014 Delegation and dynamic incentives RAND Journal of Economics A 2
2012 Mediated contracts and mechanism design Journal of Economic Theory A 1
2011 Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning Review of Economic Studies S 2
2009 Entrepreneurial Financing, Advice, and Agency Costs Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 1
2009 Monopoly distortions in durability and multi-dimensional quality Economics Letters C 1
2007 Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication Journal of Economic Theory A 2
2007 VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities Economics Letters C 2
2006 Interim Information in Long‐Term Contracts Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 1
2006 Timing of verification procedures: Monitoring versus auditing Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 1
2006 Buried in paperwork: Excessive reporting in organizations Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 1
2006 Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal-agent models Journal of Economic Theory A 1
2005 Honest certification and the threat of capture International Journal of Industrial Organization B 1
2003 Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle Economics Letters C 1
2000 Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case Economics Letters C 2
1999 Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1997 Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal–Supervisor–Agent Relationship Scandanavian Journal of Economics B 1
1997 Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship Review of Economic Studies S 1