Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2013
Volume: 82
Issue: C
Pages: 490-502

Authors (3)

Bajoori, Elnaz (not in RePEc) Flesch, János (not in RePEc) Vermeulen, Dries (Maastricht University)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Simon and Stinchcombe distinguish two approaches to perfect equilibrium, the “trembling hand” approach, and the “finitistic” approach, for games with compact action spaces and continuous payoffs. We investigate relations between the different types of perfect equilibrium introduced by Simon and Stinchcombe. We also propose an improved version of the finitistic approach, and prove existence.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:490-502
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-29