Stable lexicographic rules for shortest path games

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2014
Volume: 125
Issue: 2
Pages: 266-269

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

For the class of shortest path games, we propose a family of new cost sharing rules satisfying core selection. These rules allocate shares according to some lexicographic preference relation. A computational procedure is provided. Our results relate to those of Tijs et al. (2011).

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:2:p:266-269
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24