Institution: Virginia Polytechnic Institute
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 4.04 | 0.00 | 1.01 | 0.50 | 5.55 | 74% |
| All Time | 4.04 | 4.04 | 1.01 | 2.52 | 11.60 | 90% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Strategyproof Choice of Social Acts | American Economic Review | S | 2 |
| 2019 | Stability and fairness in the job scheduling problem | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2019 | A cost sharing example in which subsidies are necessary for stability | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2014 | Stable lexicographic rules for shortest path games | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2013 | Cycles with undistinguished actions and extended Rock–Paper–Scissors games | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2012 | Rock–paper–scissors and cycle-based games | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 2011 | Optimal management of strategic reserves of nonrenewable natural resources | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management | A | 1 |