Moral hypocrisy, power and social preferences

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Year: 2014
Volume: 107
Issue: PA
Pages: 10-24

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We study how individuals adjust their judgment of fairness and unfairness when they are in the position of spectators before and after making real decisions, and how this adjustment depends on the actions they take in the game. We find that norms that appear universal instead take into account the players’ bargaining power. Also, individuals adjust their judgments after playing the game for real money, when they behaved more selfishly and only in games where choices have no strategic consequence. We interpret this possibly self-deceptive adjustment of judgments to actions as moral hypocrisy. This behavior appears produced by the attempt to strike a compromise between self-image and payoffs, so as to release oneself of one's responsibility for selfish behavior.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jeborg:v:107:y:2014:i:pa:p:10-24
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29