Credible threats in a wage bargaining model with on-the-job search

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2012
Volume: 117
Issue: 3
Pages: 657-659

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This note shows that in standard equilibrium search models with strategic wage bargaining and on-the-job search, renegotiation does not require mutual consent. If the worker needs a credible threat to trigger renegotiation, wages are renegotiated less frequently than in the original model.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:657-659
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24