Should the US Eliminate Entry Barriers to the Practice of Law? Perspectives Shaped by Industry Deregulation

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2016
Volume: 106
Issue: 5
Pages: 171-76

Authors (2)

Clifford Winston (Brookings Institution) Quentin Karpilow (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

States' requirements that lawyers obtain a license to practice law, as well as American Bar Association (ABA) regulations of legal practice, constitute barriers to entry to the legal profession. In this paper, we argue that eliminating entry barriers in legal services would generate benefits that are similar to those resulting from deregulating U.S. network industries (i.e., transportation, communications, and energy.) Specifically, prices would fall as competition from incumbent firms and new entrants intensifies; in the long run, competitive forces and operating freedom would incentivize firms to produce innovations that significantly benefit consumers and the broader economy.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:5:p:171-76
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29