Invariance to representation of information

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2015
Volume: 94
Issue: C
Pages: 142-156

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Under weak assumptions on the solution concept, I construct an invariant selection across all finite type spaces, in which the types with identical information play the same action. Along the way, I establish an interesting lattice structure for finite type spaces and construct an equilibrium on the space of all finite types.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:94:y:2015:i:c:p:142-156
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-29