Institution: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 8.07 | 3.36 | 0.00 | 0.50 | 11.94 | 91% |
| All Time | 28.26 | 5.38 | 9.08 | 1.51 | 44.23 | 97% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks | American Economic Review | S | 2 |
| 2019 | Pretrial negotiations under optimism | RAND Journal of Economics | A | 2 |
| 2017 | Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 2 |
| 2016 | Common belief foundations of global games | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 3 |
| 2016 | Communication With Unknown Perspectives | Econometrica | S | 2 |
| 2015 | Invariance to representation of information | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |
| 2013 | Robust Predictions in Infinite-Horizon Games--an Unrefinable Folk Theorem | Review of Economic Studies | S | 2 |
| 2012 | Public Disagreement | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | B | 2 |
| 2011 | Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2011 | Nash meets Rubinstein in final-offer arbitration | Economics Letters | C | 1 |
| 2010 | Investor Sentiments | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics | B | 2 |
| 2009 | Moderation of an ideological party | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2007 | Impact of higher-order uncertainty | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2007 | Wishful Thinking in Strategic Environments | Review of Economic Studies | S | 1 |
| 2004 | Core is manipulable via segmentation | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 2004 | Waiting to Persuade | Quarterly Journal of Economics | S | 1 |
| 2003 | Walrasian bargaining | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |