Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2017
Volume: 72
Issue: C
Pages: 82-87

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a Bayesian game, assume that the type space is a complete, separable metric space, the action space is a compact metric space, and the payoff functions are continuous. We show that the iterative and fixed-point definitions of interim correlated rationalizability (ICR) coincide, and ICR is non-empty-valued and upper hemicontinuous. This extends the finite-game results of Dekel et al. (2007), who introduced ICR. Our result applies, for instance, to discounted infinite-horizon dynamic games.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:72:y:2017:i:c:p:82-87
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-29