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α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count
This paper considers whether the optimal (second-best) mass-transit policy under a uniform-fare constraint is affected by passengers' queuing disciplines, by comparing the first-in-first-out (FIFO) and the random-access queuing. We analyze the problem by extending the model of mass-transit in Kraus and Yoshida (JUE(2002)) to the case of random-access queuing. The model involves the optimal number and capacity of trains as well as pricing. It is shown that, when the shadow value of a unit of waiting time exceeds that of a unit time of being late, the passengers' queuing discipline does not have any effect on the optimal (second-best) mass-transit policy including the number of trains and runs, scheduling, and pricing. If in turn, the shadow value of a unit of waiting time is smaller than that of being late, then aggregate travel costs are lower with random-access queuing than with FIFO, due to randomization of passengers' positions in a mass.