Pre-emptive mergers and downstream cost asymmetry

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2016
Volume: 147
Issue: C
Pages: 23-26

Authors (2)

Gelves, J. Alejandro (not in RePEc) Heywood, John S. (University of Wisconsin)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

With sufficient downstream cost asymmetry a horizontal merger will be chosen over a vertical merger. This results because the technology transfer is large and the incentive to vertically merge shrinks as the horizontal merger eliminates a cost asymmetry induced “bottleneck.”

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:147:y:2016:i:c:p:23-26
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-02-02