A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem

C-Tier
Journal: Social Choice and Welfare
Year: 2004
Volume: 23
Issue: 2
Pages: 187-206

Authors (2)

Jordi Massó (Barcelona School of Economics ...) Alejandro Neme (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.505 = (α=2.02 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

View Full Article View on IDEAS/RePEc

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:spr:sochwe:v:23:y:2004:i:2:p:187-206
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-02-17