Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation

A-Tier
Journal: RAND Journal of Economics
Year: 2009
Volume: 40
Issue: 4
Pages: 611-635

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We argue that when innovation is “sequential” (so that each successive invention builds in an essential way on its predecessors) and “complementary” (so that each potential innovator takes a different research line), patent protection is not as useful for encouraging innovation as in a static setting. Indeed, society and even inventors themselves may be better off without such protection. Furthermore, an inventor's prospective profit may actually be enhanced by competition and imitation. Our sequential model of innovation appears to explain evidence from a natural experiment in the software industry.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:4:p:611-635
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24