How lotteries outperform auctions

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2011
Volume: 110
Issue: 3
Pages: 262-264

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In their recent paper Goeree et al. (2005) determine that all-pay auctions are better for fundraising activities than lotteries. We show that the introduction of asymmetry among participants with complete information could reverse this result. Complete information seems well suited to some charity environments.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:110:y:2011:i:3:p:262-264
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24