Institution: Université Paris-Saclay
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Homepage: https://olivier-bos.com/
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.52 | 0.00 | 2.52 | 62% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 3.20 | 0.00 | 3.20 | 58% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.00 | 3.20 | 2.02 | 5.21 | 82% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Auctions with signaling bidders: Optimal design and information disclosure | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2021 | Auctions with signaling concerns | Journal of Economics & Management Strategy | B | 2 |
| 2021 | Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | B | 4 |
| 2016 | Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction | Scandanavian Journal of Economics | B | 3 |
| 2012 | Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 1 |
| 2011 | How lotteries outperform auctions | Economics Letters | C | 1 |