Equal Pay for Unequal Work: Limiting Sabotage in Teams

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
Year: 2010
Volume: 19
Issue: 1
Pages: 25-53

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We demonstrate the value of “equal pay” policies in teams, even when team members have distinct abilities and make different contributions to team performance. A commitment to compensate all team members in identical fashion eliminates the incentive that each team member otherwise has to sabotage the activities of teammates in order to induce the team owner to implement a more favorable reward structure. The reduced sabotage benefits the team owner, and can secure Pareto gains under plausible circumstances.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jemstr:v:19:y:2010:i:1:p:25-53
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24