|
2025
|
The Impact of Wholesale Price Caps on Forward Contracting
|
The Energy Journal
|
B
|
2
|
|
2025
|
Motivating cost reduction in regulated industries with rolling incentive schemes
|
Energy Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2024
|
Optimal revenue adjustment in the presence of exogenous demand variation
|
Energy Economics
|
A
|
1
|
|
2024
|
On the design of price caps as sanctions
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2024
|
40 Years of Incentive Regulation: What Have We Learned, and What Questions Remain?
|
Review of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2023
|
Market Structure, Risk Preferences, and Forward Contracting Incentives
|
Journal of Industrial Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2023
|
Load-Following Forward Contracts
|
The Energy Journal
|
B
|
2
|
|
2022
|
Vertical integration and capacity investment in the electricity sector
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
2
|
|
2021
|
The political economy of voluntary public service
|
Public Choice
|
B
|
3
|
|
2021
|
On the profitability of self‐sabotage
|
Canadian Journal of Economics
|
C
|
2
|
|
2021
|
The impact of vertical integration on losses from collusion
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
3
|
|
2021
|
Vertical Merger Policy: Special Considerations in Regulated Industries
|
Review of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2020
|
Revealing transactions data to third parties: Implications of privacy regimes for welfare in online markets
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
2
|
|
2020
|
Motivating the optimal procurement and deployment of electric storage as a transmission asset
|
Energy Policy
|
B
|
2
|
|
2019
|
Employing cost sharing to motivate the efficient implementation of distributed energy resources
|
Energy Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2018
|
On the role of maximum demand charges in the presence of distributed generation resources
|
Energy Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2018
|
Optimal Procurement of Distributed Energy Resources
|
The Energy Journal
|
B
|
2
|
|
2018
|
An optimal rule for patent damages under sequential innovation
|
RAND Journal of Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2017
|
Pricing to preclude sabotage in regulated industries
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
3
|
|
2017
|
Designing Compensation for Distributed Solar Generation: Is Net Metering Ever Optimal?
|
The Energy Journal
|
B
|
2
|
|
2016
|
On the Merits of Antitrust Liability in Regulated Industries
|
Journal of Law and Economics
|
B
|
3
|
|
2016
|
All entrepreneurial productivity increases are not created equal
|
Southern Economic Journal
|
C
|
3
|
|
2016
|
Targeting efforts to raise rivals' costs: Moving from “Whether” to “Whom”
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
3
|
|
2016
|
When do auctions ensure the welfare-maximizing allocation of scarce inputs?
|
RAND Journal of Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2016
|
Regulation in a ‘Deregulated’ Industry: Railroads in the Post-Staggers Era
|
Review of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2015
|
Contracting with Private Knowledge of Production Capacity
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
2
|
|
2014
|
The impact of public ownership in the lending sector
|
Canadian Journal of Economics
|
C
|
3
|
|
2014
|
Motivating regulated suppliers to assess alternative technologies, protocols, and capital structures
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
3
|
|
2012
|
Extreme screening policies
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
3
|
|
2011
|
On the Performance of Linear Contracts
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
3
|
|
2011
|
Pareto-improving inefficiency
|
Oxford Economic Papers
|
C
|
3
|
|
2011
|
Exclusive Contracts, Innovation, and Welfare
|
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
|
B
|
2
|
|
2010
|
Equal Pay for Unequal Work: Limiting Sabotage in Teams
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
3
|
|
2010
|
On the design of piece-rate contracts
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
3
|
|
2010
|
Asymmetric treatment of identical agents in teams
|
European Economic Review
|
B
|
3
|
|
2010
|
INNOVATION IN VERTICALLY RELATED MARKETS*
|
Journal of Industrial Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2010
|
Contracting with private knowledge of signal quality
|
RAND Journal of Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2009
|
Designing input prices to motivate process innovation
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2009
|
Implementing high‐powered contracts to motivate intertemporal effort supply
|
RAND Journal of Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
2009
|
Procurement contracts: Theory vs. practice
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2008
|
Outsourcing, vertical integration, and price vs. quantity competition
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
3
|
|
2008
|
Does the quality of care in Medicaid MCOs vary with the form of physician compensation?
|
Health Economics
|
B
|
3
|
|
2007
|
Equity and Adverse Selection
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
2
|
|
2007
|
Equity and adverse selection with correlated costs
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
2007
|
Simple Cost-Sharing Contracts
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
2007
|
A note on optimal procurement contracts with limited direct cost inflation
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
2006
|
Regulation in Vertically-Related Industries: Myths, Facts, and Policy
|
Review of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
1
|
|
2006
|
On the Merits of Vertical Divestiture
|
Review of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
1
|
|
2005
|
On the Irrelevance of Input Prices for Make-or-Buy Decisions
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
1
|
|
2003
|
Regulating horizontal diversification
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
1
|
|
2003
|
Incentives for Anticompetitive Behavior by Public Enterprises
|
Review of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2002
|
Economic Issues at the Federal Communications Commission
|
Review of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
6
|
|
2001
|
How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk: Comment
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
2001
|
Optimal Contracting with Private Knowledge of Wealth and Ability
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
2
|
|
2000
|
Motivating Wealth-Constrained Actors
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
1999
|
Using Subjective Risk Adjusting to Prevent Patient Dumping in the Health Care Industry
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
2
|
|
1997
|
Information Management in Incentive Problems.
|
Journal of Political Economy
|
S
|
2
|
|
1997
|
Competition among Health Maintenance Organizations
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
2
|
|
1995
|
Explaining the Choice among Regulatory Plans in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry.
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
2
|
|
1995
|
Optimal industrial targeting with unknown learning-by-doing
|
Journal of International Economics
|
A
|
3
|
|
1995
|
Insurance, Adverse Selection, and Cream-Skimming
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1995
|
Using markets to allocate pollution permits and other scarce resource rights under limited information
|
Journal of Public Economics
|
A
|
2
|
|
1995
|
Explaining the Choice Among Regulatory Plans in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
2
|
|
1994
|
Designing Optional No‐Fault Insurance Policies for Health Care Systems
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
1
|
|
1994
|
Designing Optional No-Fault Insurance Policies for Health Care Systems.
|
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
|
B
|
1
|
|
1993
|
An Incentive Approach to Banking Regulation.
|
Journal of Finance
|
A
|
3
|
|
1993
|
Ignorance in Agency Problems
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1992
|
Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
1992
|
Incentives for Conservation and Quality-Improvement by Public Utilities.
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
1991
|
Technological Change and the Boundaries of the Firm.
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
1991
|
All-or-nothing information control
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
1990
|
Sharing Productive Knowledge in Internally Financed R&D Contests.
|
Journal of Industrial Economics
|
A
|
3
|
|
1989
|
Inflexible Rules in Incentive Problems.
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
1989
|
Countervailing incentives in agency problems
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1988
|
Profiting from 'countervailing' power: An effect of government control
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
1988
|
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand.
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
1988
|
Optimal contracts with public ex post information
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1988
|
repec:bla:scandj:v:90:y:1988:i:3:p:357-72
|
Scandanavian Journal of Economics
|
B
|
1
|
|
1988
|
Incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankruptcy constraints
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
1987
|
Awarding Monopoly Franchises.
|
American Economic Review
|
S
|
2
|
|
1987
|
Information, Incentives, and Organizational Mode
|
Quarterly Journal of Economics
|
S
|
2
|
|
1984
|
Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1984
|
Incentive contracting with asymmetric and imperfect precontractual knowledge
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
1
|
|
1983
|
Multi-agent control in perfectly correlated environments
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
2
|
|
1983
|
Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
1
|
|
1980
|
Precontractual information asymmetry between principal and agent : The Continuous Case
|
Economics Letters
|
C
|
1
|