The political economy of voluntary public service

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 2021
Volume: 186
Issue: 1
Pages: 29-61

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Abstract We characterize the voluntary public service policy that minimizes the expected cost of delivering a public service (e.g., jury or military service). We then examine whether a majority rule voting procedure will implement the voluntary public service policy (VPS) whenever it entails lower expected cost than mandatory public service (MPS). We find that majority rule often favors MPS in the sense that majority rule implements MPS when VPS would secure the requisite public service at lower expected cost.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:186:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00752-x
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24